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NOTES
THE REPORTORIAL POWER OF THE ALASKA
GRAND JURY
The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations
concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended. I
I. INTRODUCTION
The extent of the power of Alaska grand juries to issue recom-
mendations concerning specific public officials was brought into focus
when, on July 1, 1985, a Juneau grand jury issued a report recom-
mending that the Alaska Senate commence impeachment proceedings
against Governor William Sheffield. 2 Although the grand jury elected
not to indict the governor formally, it prepared a report alleging that
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1. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8. ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.030 (1984) provides in
pertinent part: "The grand jury shall have the power to investigate and make recom-
mendations concerning the public welfare or safety."
2. On April 24, 1985, a Juneau grand jury commenced an investigation into cir-
cumstances surrounding the state's lease of 32,000 square feet of office space from the
Fifth Avenue Center in Fairbanks. Report of the Grand Jury Concerning the Investi-
gation Conducted into the Fairbanks Consolidated State Office Lease with the Fifth
Avenue Center at 1 (July 1, 1985) [hereinafter Report of the Grand Jury]. The grand
jury directed its attention to the role of Governor Sheffield and some of his staff mem-
bers in the procurement process for the consolidation of state office space in Fair-
banks. Id. at 2-3. The governor testified before the grand jury. Id. at 14. On July 2,
1985, the grand jury released its findings to the Superior Court of the First Judicial
District of Juneau. The grand jury alleged that with the governor's approval certain
staff members had pressured the Department of Administration to change bid specifi-
cation for the office space so that only the Fifth Avenue Center could meet the specifi-
cations. Id. at 7-10. The grand jury found that the governor intervened for the
purpose of doing a favor to a political supporter, who was part owner of the Fifth
Avenue Center. Id. at 8. The grand jury also implied that the governor had lied in his
testimony. Id. at 14. The grand jury did not indict the governor or any of his staff,
however. Instead, the grand jury chose to issue a report which recommended, inter
alia, that the senate be called into special session to consider commencing impeach-
ment proceedings against Governor Sheffield. Id. at 18. The superior court that im-
panelled the grand jury accepted the report for public filing after an ex parte
proceeding with the prosecutors who conducted the grand jury investigation.
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE INVESTIGATIVE GRAND JURY IN ALASKA at 8
(Draft Report, Feb. 1986). Impeachment proceedings ensued. The senate, however,
voted not to impeach the governor. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1985, at All, col. 1.
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he had helped to steer the state's lease of office space to a political
supporter and that he had lied before the grand jury during its investi-
gation of that transaction. 3 In an ex parte proceeding with the prose-
cutors who conducted the grand jury proceedings, the trial court that
had impanelled the grand jury accepted the report for public filing.4
The trial court stated that its sole function in reviewing the report was
"to prevent the grand jury from making an illegal report." 5 This note
examines the propriety of that decision and the scope of the grand
jury's power under article I, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution.
The principal issue addressed by this note is whether the grand
jury possesses the authority to issue reports critical of identifiable indi-
viduals. Such reports have met with a varied reception. Some author-
ities have denounced reports critical of identifiable individuals as "foul
blows" that deny procedural fairness to the criticized individual. 6
Others have praised such reports as necessary to deter official wrong-
doing.7 In an attempt to clarify the power of the Alaska grand jury to
issue recommendations critical of specific individuals, Part II of this
note examines the history of the grand jury in England and the United
States with particular reference to Alaska. Part III evaluates the prin-
cipal policy arguments for and against grand jury reports. Part IV
analyzes the pertinent constitutional history of article I, section 8 in
order to define the scope of the grand jury's power. This note con-
cludes that the grand jury does have limited power to issue recommen-
dations that criticize public officials. Part V compares the law of other
jurisdictions with that of Alaska. Finally, in Part VI, the note ana-
lyzes various measures aimed at increasing procedural fairness in
grand jury reports and recommends that Alaska adopt certain
measures.
3. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 10, 14.
4. Memorandum from Daniel W. Hickey, Chief Prosecutor, to Harold M.
Brown, Attorney General, at 24-25 (Aug. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Chief Prosecutor] (quoting Transcript of the Grand Jury Concerning the Investigation
Conducted into the Fairbanks Consolidated State Office Lease with the Fifth Avenue
Center).
5. Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 4, at 51-52 (quoting Transcript
of the Grand Jury Concerning the Investigation Conducted into the Fairbanks Con-
solidated State Office Lease with the Fifth Avenue Center).
6. E.g., People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (1933).
7. E.g., In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 66, 89
A.2d 416, 444 (1952). In In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 34 N.J.
378, 169 A.2d 465 (1961), the New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed the basic princi-
ples of In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416
(1952), but disapproved of the court's failure to remove certain allegations in the re-
port that were not connected with the detrimental public conditions.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE GRAND JURY'S REPORTING POWER
The principal functions of the grand jury are to serve "as a body
of accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of
wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and op-
pressive governmental action."" The Sheffield case raises the question
of the propriety of what may be viewed as a third role - issuing re-
ports, written statements which do not formally charge any individual
with the commission of a crime. 9 An examination of the historical
development of the functions of the grand jury is essential to under-
standing how the grand jury should operate today.
A. England
Historians generally trace the origins of the modern grand jury
back to the Assize of Clarendon.10 The assize established bodies of
twelve men in each county to accuse those they believed to have com-
mitted crimes.II In its early stages, the grand jury functioned to
strengthen royal power by providing the Crown with additional con-
trol over the administration of justice.1 2 Acting solely as accuser, the
grand jury did little to protect the rights of individuals during the first
two centuries of its existence.
13
8. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1974).
9. Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment" Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L.
REv. 1103 (1955). Reports are delivered to the trial court that impanels the grand
jury. Id. Reports have been directed at community conditions, see, e.g., In re Mon-
mouth County Grand Jury, 24 N.J. 318, 321, 131 A.2d 751, 753 (1957), and some
reports have criticized specific individuals, see, e.g., Hayslip v. State, 193 Tenn. 643,
249 S.W.2d 882 (1952) (report criticized teacher for making false complaint to grand
jury), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952). Reports of the former type often go unchal-
lenged because individuals cannot allege sufficient injury to achieve standing. See In
re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Specific reports, on the other hand, are frequently challenged.
Reports should be distinguished from indictments and presentments. An indict-
ment is a formal accusation made by a prosecutor that is submitted to the grand jury
so that it may determine if there is enough evidence to obtain a conviction. If the
grand jury finds sufficient evidence, it endorses "A True Bill" on the indictment. The
grand jury simply ignores the accusation if the prosecutor's evidence is insufficient.
Comment, Constitutional Law - Judicial Powers - Legality of the Grand Jury Re-
port, 52 MICH. L. REv. 711, 714 (1954). Traditionally, a presentment is an accusation
of crime made by the grand jury from its own knowledge. The presentment provides a
basis upon which the prosecutor frames an indictment. Id. Alaska recognizes a spe-
cial form of presentment by which the grand jury may ask the trial court for instruc-
tions on the applicable law. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(o).
10. Kuh, supra note 9, at 1106.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1107.
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Gradually, the grand jury's second function - that of protecting
citizens from arbitrary government action - developed. Open pro-
ceedings had subjected individuals to public opprobrium even when
the Crown initiated unfounded prosecutions.' 4 Thus, the grand jury
began to hear witnesses in private. That practice, in turn, led to the
formation of the now firmly established rule regarding the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings.1 5
Another significant event in the evolution of the second function
occurred in 1681 when King Charles II attempted to convict Stephen
Colledge and the Earl of Shaftesbury for treason. Both men were ada-
mant Protestant opponents of the King's attempts to reestablish the
Catholic Church in England during the aftermath of the Restora-
tion.' 6 In each case, the grand jury rebuffed the King's attempts to
influence the proceedings and ignored the bills of indictment submit-
ted by the royal prosecutors.' 7 The actions of the grand juries in those
cases have been hailed as the genesis of the grand jury's role as a buffer
between innocent citizens and oppressive prosecution by the
government.18
At the same time that the grand jury was developing as a bulwark
against government oppression in England, grand juries were also issu-
ing reports. In seventeenth and eighteenth century England, grand
juries inquired into the misconduct of royal officers. In 1678, for ex-
ample, a Gloucestershire grand jury commented on increasing beggar
nuisance and recommended that the constables enforce the law against
such conduct.' 9 In 1679, a county coroner was criticized for "vexing"
a coroner's jury that refused to follow his direction to find a verdict. 20
Grand juries issued reports concerning, among other things, the super-
vision of prisons by the justices, the use of false drink measures by
innkeepers, the improper care of county property, and the acceptance
by justices of improper fees.21
14. See Comment, supra note 9, at 716.
15. Note, Propriety of a Breach of Grand Jury Secrecy When No Indictment Is
Returned, 7 Hous. L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1970). Under the rule of grand jury secrecy,
only the grand jurors, the prosecutor, the witness under examination, and certain
court officers are permitted to attend the proceedings. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(k).
Only the jurors may be present when the grand jury deliberates. Id. Disclosure of
matters occurring before the grand jury to outside parties is strictly limited. See
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(1).
16. Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand Jury Indict-
ment - A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1078
(1984).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1108.
19. Kuh, supra note 9, at 1110.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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One early decision even suggests that there may have been com-
mon law authority for grand jury reports. In 1683, a Chester grand
jury informally charged the Earl of Macclesfield with seditious con-
duct without indicting him. 22 The Earl sued a member of the grand
jury for libel. The defense argued that it was common practice for
grand juries to issue reports on any matters concerning county busi-
ness.23 In response, the Earl's counsel asserted that it was illegal for
the grand jury to damage an individual's reputation without providing
him the opportunity to answer the allegation.24 The court, without
opinion, held unanimously for the grand juror.25 While the preceden-
tial value of the decision remains open to question,26 it is clear that
grand jury reports were a customary practice in England.
B. The United States
With little modification, our founding fathers borrowed the Eng-
lish institution of the grand jury.27 The framers of the United States
Constitution included the right to an indictment by a grand jury in the
fifth amendment for the same purposes as the grand jury had been
used in England - to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe a certain person has committed a crime and to protect citizens
from unfounded prosecution.28
Additionally, the colonists brought the practice of grand jury re-
porting on matters of public concern to America. New Jersey grand
juries issued reports on public affairs as early as 1680.29 In 1766, an
Annapolis grand jury issued a report on the neglect of city officials to
account for lottery proceeds and to attend meetings.30 In 1742, a
Charleston grand jury noted the failure of constables to regulate mar-
kets properly. 31 During the Revolution, grand juries cited the neglect
of duty by public officers and recommended new laws for exigent situ-
ations.32 A South Carolina grand jury in 1783 recommended regula-
tion of attorneys' fees. 33 After the ratification of the Constitution,
22. Earl of Macclesfield v. Starkey, 10 How. St. Tr. 1330, 1330-33 (1684-1685).
23. Id. at 1356.
24. Id. at 1345-46.
25. Id. at 1414.
26. See Comment, Grand Jury Reports: An Examination of the Law in Texas and
Other Jurisdictions, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 374, 379-80 (1975).
27. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884).
28. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
29. See In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 41, 89
A.2d 416, 427 (1952).
30. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634-1941, at 18 (1963).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 36-37.
33. Id. at 42.
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grand juries continued to reprimand local officials and to suggest
change in local government. 34 Although courts disagree over whether
the grand jury had common law authority to issue reports,3 5 the prac-
tice itself was prevalent, as these examples illustrate.
C. Alaska
Prior to Alaska's statehood, the territorial legislature adopted a
statute that required grand juries to investigate the conditions and
management of prisons and judicial offices.36 The statute did not ex-
plicitly mention reporting the results of these inquiries. Nevertheless,
grand juries normally made an annual inspection of the jails and re-
ported their findings and recommendations to the court.3 7 These re-
ports were typically based on simple observation rather than formal
investigation.38 Records of territorial grand juries do, however, reveal
at least one investigative report. In 1954, a Ketchikan grand jury in-
vestigated police corruption in connection with prostitution and re-
turned a famous report that led to the indictments of the chief of
police and the United States Attorney in Ketchikan. 39
After statehood, article I, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution
granted grand juries the power to "investigate and make recommenda-
tions concerning the public welfare or safety."' 40 Since the enactment
of the constitution, grand juries have continued to report on jail condi-
tions, courthouse facilities, criminal justice procedures, and general
crime conditions in the community.4' Grand juries have also issued
reports critical of specific individuals. For example, in 1967, a Fair-
banks grand jury investigated jail conditions and returned a report
criticizing management of the jail generally and holding the named
superintendent responsible. The grand jury also recommended
changes in policy, personnel, and supervision at the jail.42 In 1974, an
Anchorage grand jury report criticized the Director of the Division of
Corrections and the Commissioner of Health and Social Services.43
34. Id. at 47.
35. Compare In re Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 675 (D. Md.
1970) (finding common law authority to issue reports critical of public official) with In
re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, 152 Md. 616, 623, 137 A. 370, 372 (1927)
(finding no common law power to criticize individuals in grand jury reports).
36. ALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 66-8-29 (1949).
37. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 44-45.
38. Id. at 45.
39. Id.
40. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8.
41. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 45.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 4, at 27 (quoting Report of the
Grand Jury, Third Judicial District, at 2, 6 (November 8, 1974)).
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And in 1975, an Anchorage grand jury investigated the criminal jus-
tice system and made recommendations concerning a correctional of-
ficer, the public defender's office, and the district attorney's office.44
III. THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GRAND
JURY REPORTS CRITICAL OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS
There is significant debate over the propriety of grand jury re-
ports, particularly those that criticize individuals. Analysis of the pol-
icy arguments underlying each side of the debate will facilitate
understanding of the concerns of the framers of the Alaska Constitu-
tion when they discussed article I, section 8. Furthermore, this analy-
sis will help in evaluating whether reform of this power is necessary,
and, if so, which methods will be effective.
A. Arguments Opposing Grand Jury Reports
The principal argument against reports that criticize individuals
proceeds from the concept of fundamental fairness. Essentially, the
argument is that a critical report subjects the person named therein to
a quasi-official accusation of misconduct that he cannot answer in an
authoritative forum.45 By criticizing a public official for negligence or
incompetence in administering his office, the grand jury imposes upon
that official the punishment of public reprimand. This punishment is
based upon ex parte proceedings conducted in secret.46 Typically, one
being investigated has no right to know of the grand jury's inquiry or
to confront his accusers. 47 Although an individual indicted by a grand
jury faces the same rules, that person is furnished at trial with an offi-
cial forum in which to rebut the charges against him. A report, on the
other hand, does not normally lead to further judicial proceedings and
is, in that sense, final. 48 In most instances, the criticized individual is
not provided with an official opportunity to answer the allegations of
the report.
The fact that the grand jury is generally well respected heightens
these concerns. The public properly considers the grand jury as an
arm of the impanelling court.49 Thus, unlike newspaper reports or
reports of other investigative bodies, grand jury statements carry an
44. Id. at 28-30 (quoting 1975 Special Investigation Grand Jury Report, Third
Judicial District, at 2-3 (November 5, 1975)).
45. In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
46. Id.
47. Simpson v. Langston, 281 Ark. 458, 460, 664 S.W.2d 872, 873 (1984).
48. Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 154, 173 N.E.2d 21, 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39-
40 (1961).
49. Comment, supra note 9, at 717.
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aura of judicial approval.50 The community often does not question
the accuracy of the pronouncements of the grand jury.5' And even if
the public or the press desires to scrutinize the basis of a report, the
rule requiring secrecy of grand jury minutes thwarts their efforts to
look behind the report and assess its reliability. 52 For these reasons, in
most jurisdictions where there is no prepublication review of the evi-
dence underlying the report by the trial court, even a litigant who suc-
ceeds in having the court remove a published report from the record
has won a "hollow victory." The grand jury had already made its
official impression on the public.53
Other arguments against the grand jury report are less compel-
ling. Some courts have indicated that reports contravene the rule of
grand jury secrecy.54 As noted earlier, grand jury reports were cus-
tomarily issued at common law at the same time as the secrecy re-
quirement developed.5 5 It therefore appears inconsistent to suggest
that this secrecy rule was intended to nullify the historical reporting
function of grand juries by preventing any disclosure of a report.
More importantly, most of the articulated policy reasons for grand
jury secrecy are not implicated after the grand jury has completed its
investigation and returned its report to the trial court.
The policy concerns underlying the grand jury secrecy rule have
been expressed as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent suborna-
tion of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify
before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted
by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5)
to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure
of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the ex-
pense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.56
After the grand jury has returned its report, escape is irrelevant
because the report does not indict the person mentioned. Nor is there
call for concern over subornation of witnesses or restraints on grand
50. In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 604, 125 N.Y.S. 313, 318 (1910).
51. Comment, supra note 9, at 717.
52. Id. at 717-18.
53. See In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 34 N.J. 378, 392, 169
A.2d 465, 472 (1961).
54. In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 865-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26 and 29-35.
56. United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md.
1931).
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jury deliberations. The investigation is complete, the grand jury has
reached its decision, and no trial follows. Grand jury proceedings do
not implicate the final policy reason for grand jury secrecy because a
public official who is criticized in a report is not "innocent." The
grand jury has found misconduct or negligence in office on the part of
this official. On the other hand, there should be some concern over the
fullness and candor of the testimony of witnesses. The possibility of
future disclosure of the witnesses' testimony to outside parties may
influence some witnesses.57
The fact that grand jury reports implicate a few of the policy rea-
sons for grand jury secrecy should not, by itself, preclude public filing
of such reports. In some situations, other legitimate interests may out-
weigh the need for grand jury secrecy. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized the right of civil litigants to obtain fed-
eral grand jury transcripts in appropriate circumstances.5 8 In such
cases, courts weigh the need for disclosure against the need for contin-
ued secrecy. 59 Should courts apply this balancing test when con-
fronted with grand jury reports, the need for disclosure will frequently
outweigh any remaining interests in secrecy - at least in those juris-
dictions that acknowledge the importance of exposing the noncriminal
misconduct of public officials. 60
Critics of grand jury reports also argue that the grand jury lacks
objective standards to evaluate noncriminal misconduct.61 When the
grand jury considers an indictment, it analyzes the alleged conduct
under standards defined by the legislature in the criminal statutes.
When the grand jury issues a report on conduct not constituting a
crime, it ordinarily must rely on the jurors' own subjective criteria of
public morals. Actually, however, this may represent a significant ad-
vantage of reports: reports allow grand juries to express the con-
science of the community and to require conduct that meets a
standard higher than the standard set by the criminal laws.62 If the
report concerns conduct that does not contravene the community's
standards, the public may well disregard the report.63
57. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370 F.
Supp. 1219, 1229-30 (D.D.C. 1974); BEALE & BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND
PRACTICE, § 3.03 n.3 (1986).
61. See, e.g., Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 154, 173 N.E.2d 21, 26, 212
N.Y.S.2d 33, 39-40 (1961).
62. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.03 n.3.
63. See Monroe v. Garrett, 17 Cal. App. 3d 280, 284, 94 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533-34
(1971).
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Opponents also contend that the grand jury's reporting power is
not consistent with the grand jury's historical role as a protector of the
individual.64 When the grand jury merely considers a request for an
indictment it does nothing affirmatively to assist the state. The accu-
sation is formed by the prosecutor, and an indictment is merely an
acquiescence in this accusation. In the indictment situation, therefore,
the grand jury's role is inherently that of a buffer between the state and
the individual. Opponents argue that when the grand jury participates
in the initial investigation and issues a report, the grand jury goes be-
yond evaluating the accusation and in fact accuses the individual. 65
The historical development of the grand jury weakens the force of
this argument. First, the grand jury has an accusatory purpose, which
was its original role.6 6 The grand jury did not begin to serve as a
buffer against arbitrary prosecution until centuries after its inception.
Second, the grand jury has had a reporting function in addition to its
indicting function for the past several centuries. 67 This long history
suggests that the reporting function is not inconsistent with the grand
jury's role as a protector against arbitrary prosecution.
B. Arguments Favoring Reports
The principal argument in favor of the grand jury's reporting
power is that there are many official acts that do not constitute indict-
able conduct but are nonetheless against the public interest and war-
rant exposure. Since the people must be informed if democratic
government is to function effectively, it is essential that such miscon-
duct be revealed in an effective, official manner.68 In affirming the
publication of a grand jury report critical of prison officials, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated:
No community desires to live a hairbreadth above the criminal
level, which might be the case if there were no official organ of pub-
lic protest. Such [reports] are a great deterrent to official wrongdo-
ing. By exposing wrongdoing, moreover, such [reports] inspire
public confidence in the capacity of the body politic to purge itself
of untoward conditions. 69
64. See, e.g., In re Jones, 101 A.D. 55, 61, 92 N.Y.S. 275, 279 (1905) (Woodward,
J., dissenting).
65. Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARv. L. REV. 590, 594
(1961).
66. See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1105; see also supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
67. See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1105-06; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-
26 & 29-35.
68. See In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 65-66, 89
A.2d 416, 443-44 (1952).
69. Id. at 66, 89 A.2d at 444.
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Courts in jurisdictions favoring reports have emphasized the
growing complexity of modem government "that defies the best inten-
tions of the citizen to know and understand it."'70 With an ever-ex-
panding government bureaucracy, public employees become further
removed from those officials directly answerable to the voters, while
the public's awareness of the activities even of elected officials les-
sens.71 If the people are to remain confident in this type of govern-
ment, there should be a body of citizens capable of monitoring official
wrongdoing.72 Proponents of the grand jury's reportorial power main-
tain that the grand jury is the appropriate body to accomplish this
important purpose.73
Increasing government complexity has spurred the adoption of
other investigatory bodies. These include legislative and executive
bodies as well as private organizations, most notably the news media.
These bodies may lead to greater accountability among public officials,
but they are unlikely to be as effective as the grand jury in achieving
impartial disclosure of official misconduct. A comparison of the grand
jury with these groups suggests that the grand jury should continue as
an investigatory body.
One significant problem with legislative and executive committees
is that political concerns often influence their investigations. 74 These
concerns can make such committees insensitive to the means used to
investigate. For example, in contrast to the grand jury practice of con-
ducting secret deliberations, these bodies often open their investiga-
tions to the public and thereby increase the risk that individual desires
for career-enhancing publicity will determine the tenor of their investi-
gation.75 Furthermore, even an unfounded investigation can seriously
stigmatize an individual in the eyes of the community. 76 Finally, since
the outcome is often politically influenced, there may be an intentional
lack of thoroughness in legislative and executive investigations.77
Weaknesses also plague private investigations. First, editorial
policies and profit motives may influence investigations by the news
70. Id. at 65, 89 A.2d at 443.
71. Kuh, supra note 9, at 1118.
72. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 523 (Fla. 1977).
73. Id.
74. See Note, supra note 65, at 602.
75. See id.
76. See In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 67, 89
A.2d 416, 444 (1952). On the other hand, when the grand jury determines that there
has been no misconduct, the public does not learn of the investigation since the inves-
tigation was conducted in secret. See supra note 15.
77. Kuh, supra note 9, at 1118.
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media.78 Second, private investigations cannot compel persons to sup-
ply necessary information. 79 Finally, no overseeing body exists to
monitor the conduct of these investigatory bodies.80
Although some authorities suggest that grand juries are not com-
pletely free from political motivations,81 most agree that jurors do not
have the same sensitivity to political considerations as legislative or
executive committees. 82 Because grand jury proceedings are con-
ducted in secret, a grand juror has no real incentive to advance his
ambitions through his role as a grand juror. The subpoena power pos-
sessed by grand juries facilitates complete investigations. 83 Further-
more, the secrecy requirement minimizes the risk of reprisal against
witnesses.84
The grand jury is not without shortcomings as an investigatory
body. Jurors are not professional investigators. Because grand juries
have limited budgets, they seldom hire their own counsel or detectives.
This increases the grand jury's dependence on the prosecutor to per-
form the investigation and to conduct the proceedings. 85 If the prose-
cutor is able to dominate the proceedings, he may interject his own
political ambitions into the investigation. 86 The potential for difficulty
may, however, be reduced. First, the local government can increase
the grand jury's budget in order to allow it to hire its own investigator
and counsel in cases where the prosecutor's interests might influence
the proceedings.8 7 Second, blue ribbon grand juries composed of the
better educated citizens might be used. "Blue ribbon" jurors are more
likely to question witnesses and assume an active role in the investiga-
tion, thereby assuring more informed conclusions. 88
In response to fundamental fairness concerns, supporters of grand
jury reports argue that justifiable reports on public officials outweigh
whatever harm might befall such individuals.8 9 Proponents of the re-
porting power note that public office is a "trust" that the citizenry may
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1119.
80. Id. at 1118.
81. See Tennant, Grand Juries in the Metropolitan Counties of New Jersey - Do
They Function in the Public Interest 12 THE PANEL 21 (1934).
82. E.g., Note, supra note 65, at 602.
83. See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1119.
84. Id.
85. Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J.
687, 697 (1932).
86. Note, supra note 65, at 602-03.
87. Id. at 597.
88. Id. at 603.
89. See, e.g., In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 159-61, 11 So. 2d 316, 319
(1943).
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withdraw if the holder abuses the office. 90 Thus, an official assumes
some risk of criticism when he voluntarily enters office.91 Further-
more, the mere possibility that the grand jury may issue reports may
cause officials to regard their offices as trusts and thus deter corrupt
and incompetent government. 92
IV. THE LAW IN ALASKA
Alaska Constitution, article I, section 8 provides in pertinent
part: "The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommen-
dations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be sus-
pended."' 93 No Alaska appellate court has addressed the meaning of
this sentence. Alaska grand juries have, however, issued reports, some
of which have criticized specific officials.94 The trial court that ac-
cepted for public filing the report on Governor Sheffield stated that its
authority to review the contents of the report was narrow:
The Court's sole function is its power to prevent the grand jury
from making an illegal report. That is, a report beyond its jurisdic-
tion; a report that's not the result of its investigation. The report
here, which I read through last night, clearly is neither. It is on the
subject of the investigation and it is a result of the investigation. 95
To determine if the trial court's conclusion comports with the inten-
tion of the framers of the Alaska Constitution, it is appropriate to ana-
lyze the constitutional history pertaining to the grand jury's power
under article I, section 8.96
A. The Constitutional History
On December 15, 1955, the Alaska Constitutional Committee on
the Preamble and the Bill of Rights submitted Committee Proposal
Seven, which included the section on grand jury authority. Proposal
Seven initially provided in pertinent part: "[T]he power of grand ju-
ries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers,
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See In re Presentment by Camden Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 66, 89 A.2d 416,
444 (1952).
93. ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 8.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
95. Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 4, at 51-52 (quoting Transcript
of Grand Jury Concerning the Investigation Conducted into the Fairbanks Consoli-
dated State Office Lease with the Fifth Avenue Center).
96. The pertinent portions of the constitutional history are set out in the Appen-
dix to this note.
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and to find indictments in connection therewith shall never be sus-
pended."' 97 Delegate Buckalew, who was a member of the committee
that drafted the proposal, understood the proposal to grant the grand
jury power to investigate and return indictments. Buckalew, however,
did not view the proposal as authorizing grand jury reports.98 Subse-
quent judicial interpretations of similar language in the grand jury
provisions of the constitutions of New York99 and Missouri 00 support
Buckalew's interpretation. Courts in those states have concluded that
their constitutional provisions cannot be construed as authorizing
grand jury reports.101 These courts viewed the language as in-
separably linking the grand jury's power to inquire into the miscon-
duct of public officers with its power to indict.102 Only an explicit
grant of legislative authority could empower grand juries in those
states to issue reports critical of individuals. 10 3 Thus, if the framers
had adopted Proposal Seven, it appears unlikely that there would be
constitutional authority for grand jury reports in Alaska.
The Convention, however, did not adopt the Proposal. Instead,
the framers approved a slightly altered version of an amendment to
Proposal Seven offered by Delegate Barr. On January 6, 1956, Dele-
gate Barr proffered the following amendment: "The power of grand
juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning condi-
tions detrimental to the public welfare shall never be suspended."' 0 4
This provision grants broad investigatory powers to the grand jury.
Although courts in other jurisdictions disagree as to whether the
power to investigate, standing alone, implies the power to report the
97. MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION, app. V, at 64 (1956) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION].
98. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1405.
99. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "The power of grand juries
to inquire into the wilful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indictments
or to direct the filing of informations in connection with such inquiries, shall never be
suspended or impaired by law."
100. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides in pertinent part: "[Tihe power of grand
juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find
indictments in connection therewith, shall never be suspended."
101. In re Interim Report of Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1977); Wood v.
Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 173 N.E.2d 21, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
102. In re Interim Report of Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d at 481; Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at
151, 173 N.E.2d at 24, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
103. In re Interim Report of Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d at 482; Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at
156, 173 N.E.2d at 27, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The New York State Legislature re-
sponded to the Hughes decision by enacting section 253-a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which authorizes grand juries to issue reports critical of individuals. This
rule is currently codified in section 190.85 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law.
104. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1404.
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results of such inquiry, 10 5 the Convention expressly granted Alaska
grarid juries the power to make recommendations in connection with
its investigations. Thus, the framers contemplated a power to issue
statements other than indictments.
Conversations between the delegates also shed light on the proper
subject matter of these recommendations. During the debates over ar-
ticle I, section 8, Delegate Rivers explained that the grand jury's au-
thority at the time of the Convention extended to the investigation of
public officers and institutions. 106 Rivers then asked Delegate Barr if
he would agree to express the grand jury's authority as the power to
"investigate public offices and institutions and make recommenda-
tions."'10 7 Barr would not so consent. He stated that his amendment
would grant a broader power than Rivers suggested. 108 Barr's amend-
ment would allow the grand jury to "make recommendations concern-
ing other things than public offices and officers."' 1 9 By implication,
the framers intended, at the least, to grant the grand jury the power to
issue recommendations concerning public offices and officers, some-
thing which Barr maintained was the duty of the grand jury. 10
Courts in many jurisdictions where grand juries investigate public
institutions attempt to make a distinction between reports on general
conditions that do not name individuals and reports that criticize spe-
cific individuals.I1  Several jurisdictions permit publication of the for-
mer type of report while holding that the grand jury is powerless to
issue reports of the latter type."l2 Thus, the final issue in the analysis
of the constitutional history of the Alaska reportorial provision is
whether the grand jury may mention public officers in its recommen-
dations or whether it must confine itself to recommending general
changes in administrative procedures without naming public officials.
The fact that the framers granted the grand jury the power to issue
recommendations concerning public officers supports the argument
that they intended that the grand jury have the power to name those
officers in at least some circumstances. The framers addressed this
issue even more specifically. Responding to Delegate Buckalew's
105. Compare In re Interim Report of Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d at 482 (reporting
power must be expressed) with In re Report of Ormsby County Grand Jury, 74 Nev.
80, 85, 322 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (1958) (reporting power implicit in power to
investigate).
106. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1405.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1406.
111. See, e.g., In re Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, 152 Md. 616, 631-32,
137 A. 370, 376 (1927).
112. Id.
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strenuous objections to Delegate Barr's proposed amendment, Dele-
gate Barr explained:
[The grand jury does] not necessarily have to defame any person or
mention him by name. If the tax collector was using methods not
acceptable to the public, they might make a recommendation for a
change in the system of tax collection, etc., and I think it would be
their duty to do so. 13
Delegate Barr's statement is equivocal, but appears to leave open the
possibility that a grand jury can mention a public officer by name in its
recommendation. That the framers intended to grant such authority
to the grand jury is supported by Delegate Buckalew's vote against
Barr's proposal. Buckalew perceived significant differences between
the authority granted the grand jury under Barr's proposal and that
granted by the committee's Proposal Seven. Buckalew objected vigor-
ously to the amendment:
[m]y prime objection to this particular amendment is that I think
and feel certain it will open the door, for example, the grand jury
might have under investigation the conduct of some particular pub-
lic office, for example, the governor, or any public official, the local
tax collector. They don't have enough evidence to return an indict-
ment but this would give them the power to blast him good and
hard, and I think it would lead to all kinds of trouble, and I think it
is an unheard of provision. The recommendation of the Committee
provided that the grand jury could investigate, they could return
indictments, but it certainly did not give them the privilege to more
or less defame somebody if they did not have quite enough action
for a bill. Under this they could discredit him completely, and he
would have no way of answering. He might be able to come back
and get the report of the grand jury stricken from the records of the
court, but the damage would then be done. I think it is extremely
dangerous because a citizen would not have any protection. Once it
was published the only thing he could do would be to then come in
and ask the court to strike portions of it. For that reason I would
object to it. 1 14
Delegate Buckalew apparently believed that his concerns about the
amendment were not abrogated because he was one of the eight dele-
gates who voted against the amendment. 115
Delegate Barr's statement, however, implies some limit on the
grand jury's power to name public officials in its recommendations.
Unfortunately, the statement does not explain when it would be ap-
propriate to name a public official in a recommendation. Alaska
should adopt an express standard that allows naming public officials in
limited circumstances. The New Jersey Supreme Court articulated
113. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1405-06
(emphasis added).
114. Id. at 1405.
115. Id. at 1407-08.
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such an intermediate standard in In re Presentment by Camden
County Grand Jury:1 16
[T]he subject must be a matter of general public interest, or relate to
some aspect of public affairs, or to some public evil or condition to
which, in the discretion of the jury, the attention of the community
should be directed. And censure of a public official is permissible
only where it may be said with absolute certainty that his connec-
tion with the condemned matter is such that its existence is inextri-
cably related to non-criminal failure to discharge his public
duty.... The [report] cannot be used to single out persons in pri-
vate or official positions and impugn their motives, or by word or
innuendo hold them to scorn or to censure.1 17
The example Delegate Barr provided concerning the tax collector
may be used to illustrate the operation of this standard. The example
lacks clarity, but Barr may be hypothesizing that there is a poor tax
collection scheme and that the legislature should change the system.
In that case, the intolerable conditions in the community - for exam-
ple, excessive audits or wealthy persons not paying their appropriate
share - would not be inextricably related to the tax collector's negli-
gence but instead to the legislature's failure to adopt an acceptable
scheme. In short, the tax collector is not responsible for the depre-
cated conditions and therefore should not be named in the report.
Suppose, however, that the legislature changed the tax collection
procedures as recommended, but that a subsequent grand jury investi-
gation revealed that the tax collector had implemented a perfectly ac-
ceptable taxation scheme in an incompetent or negligent manner and
the same intolerable conditions prevailed. In such instance, the tax
collector's failure to discharge his duty would be inextricably related
to the deteriorated public conditions. This situation would appear to
be as much a matter of public welfare as the situation in Barr's hypo-
thetical. Because the same conditions prevail, it would be as much in
the public interest to have this official misconduct corrected by having
the tax collector more closely supervised, or perhaps even removed
from office, as it would be to have the legislature change the system in
Barr's hypothetical. To do this, of course, would necessitate naming
the official in a recommendation.
In light of the fact that the framers granted the grand jury such
broad power to investigate and to make recommendations, policy con-
siderations also support an interpretation allowing this incidental criti-
cism of public officials. First, a report on general conditions that
makes a broad recommendation for administrative changes in a large
public agency will generally be understood as implicitly criticizing all
116. 34 N.J. 378, 169 A.2d 465 (1961).
117. Id. at 391, 169 A.2d at 472.
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of those in charge.' 18 The grand jury, however, may have determined
that only a few individuals are at fault. In the second tax collection
hypothetical, for example, perhaps only some of the auditors were re-
sponsible for incompetent administration. Given the potential for
harm from reports, only those persons responsible for the detrimental
conditions should be criticized. Second, specific criticism may render
the recommendations more useful. If the report is specific, those to
whom the recommendation is addressed will not have to conduct an-
other investigation to determine which individuals are responsible." 19
In addition, remedies can be more carefully tailored if the problem is
specifically identified. 120 Third, an inability to issue reports with inci-
dental criticism of those responsible might actually prohibit certain
reports entirely. In a small agency with few officials, a report will in-
herently criticize specific individuals even though they are not men-
tioned by name. 12 1 The framers did not indicate that such a report
should be disallowed if it concerns a legitimate subject of public
welfare.
The constitutional history indicates that the Alaska Constitution
authorizes grand juries to make recommendations about conditions
concerning the public welfare or safety and to mention public officials
in limited circumstances. As the foregoing discussion suggests, inci-
dental criticism of public officials is appropriate when the official's
noncriminal failure to discharge his duty is inextricably related to the
deteriorated public conditions.
B. The Proper Scope of the Grand Jury's Power to Make
Recommendations
1. Factual Findings. Although article I, section 8 mentions only
recommendations, the framers must have contemplated that the grand
jury's report include factual findings in support of its recommenda-
tions. Otherwise, the institution to which the grand jury addresses the
recommendation cannot comprehend the need for the suggested
change. The grand jury merely recommends; it has no power to en-
force its suggestions. 122 The institutions responsible for effecting
change must determine if change is needed. If the institutions have no
factual findings on which to base their decisions, they might simply
ignore the recommendation or implement an unnecessary change.
118. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.03.
119. Kuh, supra note 9, at 1130.
120. Id.
121. See In re Grand Jury of Wabasha County, 309 Minn. 148, 155, 244 N.W.2d
253, 257 (1976) (Scott, J., concurring).
122. See In re Report of Ormsby County Grand Jury, 74 Nev. 80, 86, 322 P.2d
1099, 1102 (1958).
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Thus, factual findings seem to be implicit in the reporting of effective
recommendations.123
2. Recommendations Concerning Indictable Conduct. Many ju-
risdictions that allow grand jury reports justify reports on the ground
that the grand jury report is the only effective, official method for ex-
posing noncriminal official misconduct.124 There already exists an ef-
fective mode of determining whether there has been criminal conduct:
indictment followed by a jury trial. This procedure ensures the indi-
vidual full due process protections and, hence, is not subject to the
same fairness concerns as are reports. 125 Consequently, a grand jury
report should not imply that any named or identifiable person has
committed a criminal offense. The majority of jurisdictions permitting
grand jury reports agree that, if the grand jury finds probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed, its only course is to indict that
individual.126
In this respect, the trial court in the Sheffield case may have erred
in accepting the report. The report's allegations concerning the gover-
nor's involvement in the lease of the office buildings appear to indicate
a violation of Alaska's official misconduct statute.1 27 To contravene
that statute, a public official must, with intent to benefit himself,
knowingly make an unauthorized exercise of his official power or
knowingly refrain from performing a required official duty.12 8 The
grand jury expressly found that the governor acted with intent to ob-
tain a benefit for himself by steering the lease of office space by the
state to a campaign contributor.12 9 Furthermore, the governor was
123. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 521 (Fla. 1977)
(a recommendation is "proper" under the Florida reporting statute only if supported
by a factual foundation).
124. E.g., In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 66, 89
A.2d 416, 443-44 (1952).
125. See Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 154, 173 N.E.2d 21, 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33,
39-40 (1961).
126. See Biglieri v. Washoe County Grand Jury Report, 95 Nev. 696, 700, 601
P.2d 703, 704 (1979); Appeal of Messano, 16 N.J. 142, 147, 106 A.2d 537, 539 (1954);
State v. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 329, 164 S.E. 873, 877 (1932).
127. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.850 (1983). This section provides in part:
Official misconduct. (a) A public servant commits the crime of official mis-
conduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or deprive another
person of a benefit, the public servant
(I) performs an act relating to the public servant's office but constitut-
ing an unauthorized exercise of the public servant's official functions, know-
ing that the act is unauthorized; or
(2) knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon
the public servant by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of the public
servant's office.
128. Id.
129. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 10.
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not authorized to direct changes in the specifications of a bid proposal
for office space at the behest of a political supporter. The grand jury
stated that it chose not to issue an indictment because it would be
difficult to prove that the governor knew his actions were unauthor-
ized. 130 If the alleged conduct falls within the parameters of a crimi-
nal statute, however, the grand jury should indict such person or
ignore the allegations. 131 The grand jury also strongly implied that the
governor perjured himself before the grand jury. 132 Such conduct is,
of course, criminal. 3 3 The grand jury's actions might be viewed as
harmless error in light of the fact that the governor was able to answer
the allegations against him before the house of representatives. The
legislature could have, however, ignored the grand jury's recommen-
dation to institute impeachment proceedings, thus denying the gover-
nor an opportunity to answer. In any event, many persons mentioned
in grand jury reports will not have this opportunity to rebut allega-
tions in an official forum.
3. Subjects of Reports. Most jurisdictions permitting reports con-
demn reports reflecting on private individuals as opposed to public
officials. 134 This distinction makes sense. A public official assumes
some risk of criticism upon entering office, and, when an official be-
comes derelict in his duties, a report should reveal this breach of
trust. 35 Courts in jurisdictions allowing reports hold that the com-
munity benefits derived from a justifiable report on official misconduct
outweigh any resulting personal hardship. 36 When private individu-
als are involved, however, the balance of public benefits against protec-
tion of the individual tips in favor of disallowing reports. 37 Private
individuals do not possess the semi-fiduciary capacity of public of-
ficers. Additionally, private persons do not have the same access to
the news media as do public officials to rebut allegations. 138 The
Alaska Constitution does not appear to sanction such reports because
the private actions of individuals do not concern the "public welfare."
130. Id. at 9.
131. See cases cited supra note 126.
132. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 2, at 14 ("Governor Sheffield's testi-
mony reflects a lack of candor and a disrespect for the laws of this state.").
133. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.200 (1983).
134. See, e.g., Kelly v. Sturgis, 453 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
135. In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 159, 11 So. 2d 316, 319 (1943).
136. See, e.g., In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 68,
89 A.2d 416, 444-45 (1952).
137. Comment, The Propriety of the Grand Jury Report, 34 TEX. L. REv. 746, 755
(1956).
138. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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V. THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. A Survey of Other States
In twenty-seven states, the grand jury has statutory or judicially
recognized authority to issue reports. The extent of this authority var-
ies widely. 139 Some states allow reports critical of individuals. 4°
Others authorize reports on a few specific topics such as county jails14 1
and buildings. 14 2 In three of the remaining twenty-three states, courts
have ruled that the grand jury does not have the power to investigate
noncriminal matters or to file reports of its investigations. 143 In the
other states, the grand jury's reporting power is not clear. While
courts in these jurisdictions have not ruled upon the propriety of re-
ports on general conditions, many of them have held that the grand
jury may not issue reports criticizing specific individuals. 144
Excluding Alaska, twenty-four states have expressly addressed
the authority of grand juries to issue reports critical of specific individ-
uals. 145 Grand juries in seventeen of these states do not have the
139. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.02.
140. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(1)(a) (McKinney 1982).
141. WYO. STAT. § 7-5-216 (1977).
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-79 (1985).
143. Coons v. State, 191 Ind. 580, 134 N.E. 194 (1922); In re Grand Jury of Hen-
nepin County, 271 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1978); State ex rel. Town of Caledonia v.
County Court, 78 Wis. 2d 429, 254 N.W.2d 317 (1977).
144. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.02.
145. The states that have disallowed reports criticizing specific individuals are: Al-
abama, Exparte Bums, 261 Ala. 217, 73 So. 2d 912 (1954); Arkansas, Exparte Faulk-
ner, 221 Ark. 37, 251 S.W.2d 822 (1952); Georgia, Thompson v. Macon-Bibb County
Hosp. Auth., 246 Ga. 777, 273 S.E.2d 19 (1980); Illinois, In re Report of Grand Jury
of Marshall County, 108 Ill. App. 3d 232, 438 N.E.2d 1316 (1982); Iowa, Rector v.
Smith, 11 Iowa 302 (1860); Maryland, In re Report of Grand Jury of Carroll County,
39 Md. App. 472, 386 A.2d 1246 (1978); Michigan, Bennett v. Kalamazoo County
Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 141 (1914); Minnesota, In re Grand Jury of
Hennepin County, 271 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1978); Mississippi, In re Davis, 257 So. 2d
884 (Miss. 1972); Missouri, In re Interim Report of Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d 479 (Mo.
1977); Ohio, Simington v. Shimp, 60 Ohio App. 2d 402, 398 N.E.2d 812 (1978);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 346 (1969); Tennessee, Hayslip v. State, 193
Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952); Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-11-11 (1982); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.160
(1980); Wisconsin, State ex rel. Town of Caledonia v. County Court, 78 Wis. 2d 429,
254 N.W.2d 317 (1977).
The states that have permitted reports critical of specific individuals are: Califor-
nia, People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 13 Cal. 3d 430, 531 P.2d 761,
119 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975); Florida, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So.
2d 518 (Fla. 1977); Nevada, Biglieri v. Washoe County Grand Jury Report, 95 Nev.
696, 601 P.2d 703 (1979); New Jersey, In re Presentment by Camden County Grand
Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952); New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.85(1)(a) (McKinney 1982); South Carolina, State v. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164
S.E. 873 (1932); Virginia, Cutchin v. Roanoke, 113 Va. 452, 74 S.E. 403 (1912).
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power to issue reports criticizing individuals. 46 In seven states, the
legislature or the courts have authorized grand jury reports that criti-
cize specific public officials.' 47 Of these seven states, California takes
an extreme position by granting the grand jury a virtually unrestricted
reporting power covering a wide range of areas. 48 This note has sug-
gested that Alaska's reporting power should be similar to that exer-
cised by New Jersey grand juries. 149 This is an intermediate position
in that the power to criticize individuals is limited.' 50 Indeed, most of
the states following the "minority rule" restrict the grand jury's power
in some manner to provide protection for individual liberty
interests.'51
Alaska's statutory and constitutional provisions concerning the
grand jury's reporting power differ significantly from those of most
states. Nevada, however, has a grand jury statute that is quite similar
to the grand jury provision in the Alaska Constitution, 52 and judicial
decisions in Nevada have held that the grand jury may issue reports
naming specific officials. In In re Report of Washoe County Grand
Jury, 153 a grand jury found a chief of police incompetent to administer
his office and recommended that he be replaced.' 54 The sheriff's coun-
sel argued that a certain part of the Nevada grand jury provision did
not authorize a grand jury report where no indictable conduct was
146. See cases cited supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 13 Cal. 3d 430, 433, 531
P.2d 761, 764-65, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193, 195 (1975).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
150. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.03.
151. For example, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW sections 190.85 and 190.90 provide
several procedural protections including granting the potential subject of a report the
opportunity to testify before the grand jury and to append an answer to the report.
152. NEV. REv. STAT. § 172.300 (1957) (current version at NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 172.175 (1986)) provided:
1. The grand jury must inquire into:
(a) The case of every person imprisoned in the jail of the county, on a
criminal charge, and not indicted.
(b) The condition and management of the public prisons within the
county.
(c) The willful and corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of
every description within the county.
2. The grand jury may inquire into any and all matters affecting the
morals, health and general welfare of the inhabitants of the county, or of any
administrative division thereof, or of any township, incorporated city, irriga-
tion district or town therein.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.160 (1980) permits reports on matters "affect-
ing the public interest," but expressly proscribes the identification of any individual in
such reports.
153. 77 Nev. 290, 362 P.2d 447 (1961).
154. Id. at 291-92, 362 P.2d at 447.
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found. 15 5 Another part of the statute, however, authorized inquiry
into "matters affecting the morals, health, and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the county." 156 The court held that this gave the grand
jury a broader power. Nothing in the report indicated anything more
than inefficiency and incompetency on the part of the sheriff. Since
there was no indication of criminal activity, the grand jury could not
have indicted the sheriff. The court held that these remarks in the
report were appropriate "as being the result of a legitimate inquiry
into the matters affecting the morals, health, and general welfare of the
public.'1 57 Thus, judicial interpretation of the grand jury statute most
similar to that of Alaska supports the conclusion that the grand jury
has some power to issue reports naming public officials.
B. The Federal Cases
Because Alaska was, until relatively recently, a federal territory,
analysis of federal court decisions may be helpful in defining the
proper scope of the reportorial power of Alaska grand juries. Federal
courts have not developed a uniform rule on grand jury reports; in-
stead, most decisions reflect a case-by-case balancing of individual
rights against the public's right to be informed.
There were few federal cases dealing specifically with grand jury
reports before the Alaska Constitutional Convention met.' 58 One of
these cases, In re United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 159 in-
volved a grand jury investigation of possible violations of perjury and
conspiracy laws by union officials in connection with non-Communist
affidavits filed with the National Labor Relations Board. Instead of
indicting the officials, the grand jury made a report which, in effect,
charged the officials with conspiracy and perjury.' 60 In deciding to
expunge the report, the court expressed strong disapproval of accusa-
tory reports that do not provide their subject a judicial forum in which
155. Id. at 294-95, 362 P.2d at 449.
156. NEV. REV. STAT. § 172.300(2) (1957) (emphasis added) (current version at
NEV. REV. STAT. § 172.175 (1986)).
157. In re Report of Washoe County Grand Jury, 77 Nev. at 295, 362 P.2d at 449.
158. See In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp 858 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); In re Report of the Grand Jury for the April, 1911 Term, 4 U.S. Dist. Ct. Haw.
780 (1911). In In re Report of the Grand Jury for the April, 1911 Term, upon com-
pleting an investigation of a high school, the grand jury issued a report stating that a
named teacher had "conducted himself in a very questionable and immoral manner,
which renders him, in our opinion, unfit to act as a teacher of children." Id. at 781.
The grand jury eventually withdrew the report. Although the court did not rule on
the teacher's motion to expunge the report, it indicated that reports were not within
the authority of federal grand juries. Id. at 787.
159. 111 F. Supp. 858.
160. Id. at 861.
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to respond. 161 The court also held that the report breached grand jury
secrecy. 162 The court, however, refrained from disapproving all re-
porting powers. It approved reports on general community conditions
and emphasized that the report before the court essentially charged
the officials with criminal activity.1 63 The court also noted that the
grand jury issued the report while it was still investigating the matter.
Because the grand jury might later indict some of the individuals, the
court was concerned that the report could prejudice their trials.' 64
Other federal decisions have allowed grand jury reports critical of
specific persons. In re Johnson 165 involved a grand jury report arising
out of an investigation of a confrontation between Chicago policemen
and members of the Black Panther Party. Fifteen months after the
release of the report, persons named in the report filed a motion to
expunge the report. 16 6 In affirming the denial of the motion, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that any harm was an accomplished fact and,
more importantly, emphasized that the report did not charge the ap-
pellants with criminal activity. 167 The court held that the grand jury
had authority to make the report and that its release would be in the
public interest.' 68
In In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand
Jury, 169 a grand jury delivered to the court a report of the factual find-
ings of its investigation of the Nixon Administration. The report rec-
ommended that the court forward these findings to the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, which was conducting
its impeachment investigation. 170 The court held that the grand jury
had authority to make the report, noting that the report drew no accu-
satory conclusions and deprived no one of an official forum in which
to respond.' 71 The court also emphasized that the report was not a
substitute for an indictment.' 72 Citing the significant public interest
involved, the court released the report to the Committee.' 73
In sum, federal court decisions concerning grand jury reports re-
flect a concern for individual rights by balancing these rights against
the public's need to be informed of official misconduct. Additionally,
161. Id. at 867.
162. Id. at 866.
163. Id. at 869.
164. Id.
165. 484 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1973).
166. Id. at 793-94.
167. Id. at 796-97.
168. Id. at 797.
169. 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
170. Id. at 1221.
171. Id. at 1226.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1230.
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most states permitting reports critical of identifiable individuals have
adopted specific measures designed to protect the rights of individuals
who may be the subject of those reports.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALASKA
A. Potential Problems with Alaska's System
As noted above, a true report on conditions concerning public
welfare can be beneficial in ensuring an effective government, even if it
contains incidental criticism of a public official responsible for the con-
ditions. Indeed, the framers of the Alaska Constitution considered
this power sufficiently important to preserve it in the constitution.
They viewed this power as necessary "to protect the rights of... citi-
zens." 174 Nevertheless, problems may arise in the future implementa-
tion of this power.
In its ex parte review of the proposed report in the Sheffield case,
the trial court stated that its "sole function [in reviewing the report] is
its power to prevent the grand jury from making an illegal report."' 175
The court defined "illegal reports" as those concerning matters outside
of the geographical jurisdiction of the grand jury or matters that the
grand jury has not investigated. 176 California is one of the few states
allowing reports on specific individuals that has such limited protec-
tions for individuals criticized in reports. If the report is not illegal, a
California trial court must publish the report even if "it considers it ill-
advised, insufficiently documented, or even libelous."' 177
It is submitted that this standard of review provides insufficient
protection for an individual named in a recommendation of an Alaska
grand jury and that Alaska should make certain reforms. This stan-
dard is insufficient for several reasons. First, a court could publish a
false report, which might unjustifiably harm public officials who have
performed no misdeeds. Second, concern for individual liberty inter-
ests suggests that criticism should be limited to what is necessary to
effectuate the recommendation. Finally, there exist possible four-
teenth amendment due process objections to reports critical of
individuals.
1. Publication of Reports Based upon False Factual Findings. A
report based on false factual findings may unjustifiably harm a public
174. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1405.
175. Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 4, at 51 (quoting Transcript of
the Grand Jury Concerning the Investigation Conducted into the Fairbanks Consoli-
dated State Office Lease with the Fifth Avenue Center).
176. Id. at 51-52.
177. People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. 13 Cal. 3d 430, 439, 531
P.2d 761, 766, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (1975).
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official. This not only injures the official, but it may also harm the
public, which may lose a good public servant. Perhaps, the official
could subsequently have an appellate court remove the false report
from the record. Under the trial court's standard, however, this
would not occur until after the report was published because there is
no pre-publication factual review. The harm to the official would al-
ready be done and his reputation perhaps irreparably damaged in the
minds of the public. 178 For example, a grand jury in Kansas City,
Missouri issued a heavily publicized report calling Mafia operations
there a "criminal playground" and alleging police acquiescence in
these activities. 179 Four police officers including the chief of police
were indicted. But the indictments against the chief were dropped for
failure to allege the commission of any crime. 80 Essentially, this "in-
dictment" was a report since it did not charge any individual with
committing a crime.18 1 The new police chief publicly stated that there
were no Mafia operations in Kansas City, and the city council ex-
pressed "its sincere regret for the humiliation and public distress suf-
fered by [the former chief of police] as the result of these unjust
charges, and our apologies for the misguided zeal of the officials re-
sponsible therefor."'' s2 United States District Judge John W. Oliver,
who related the facts of this report in an address, suggested that it was
doubtful that the public paid much attention to the apologies. 8 3
2. Unfairness to the Potential Subject of the Report. The second
concern with the trial court's standard involves fairness to the individ-
ual. As discussed above, federal courts weigh the interests on both
sides in determining whether a report is lawful. The standard em-
ployed by the trial court in the Sheffield case does not allow for this
balancing. Additionally, the trial court apparently failed to analyze
the procedures used in producing the report. Without judicial moni-
toring, the prosecutor may dominate the grand jury proceedings. In
such a case, the resulting report might not be based upon an independ-
ent investigation and evaluation but upon the political aspirations of
the prosecutor. 184 Although the trial court found the report was based
upon an investigation, it did not inquire into whether there was an
independent investigation of a legitimate subject of public welfare as
178. Comment, supra note 9, at 717.
179. OliverThe Grand Jury: An Effort to Get a Dragon Out of His Cave, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 166, 167.
180. Id. at 171-72.
181. See supra text accompanying note 9.
182. Oliver, supra note 179, at 172.
183. Id.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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opposed to an attempt to single out a public official for improper
purposes.
3. Due Process Objections to Reports. Finally, in deciding how to
implement the grand jury's authority, Alaska should also consider
possible fourteenth amendment due process challenges to reports.
Several United States Supreme Court decisions provide support for the
argument that reports that criticize an individual violate procedural
due process if that individual is not given notice and an opportunity to
be heard.185 Although not involving grand juries, a series of Supreme
Court decisions recognized an individual's interest in his reputation
and held that the government must provide due process before it takes
action that injures that reputation. 18 6 In Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 187 for example, a state law prohibited the sale of liquor to a
person whose excessive drinking exposed her family "to want" or cre-
ated a danger to the public. Without giving Constantineau notice and
an opportunity to be heard, the police posted a notice on all liquor
stores forbidding sale of liquor to her. The Supreme Court held that
this "posting" by the government placed Constantineau's reputation at
risk and thus caused the type of "grievous loss" that triggers due pro-
cess protection. 188
In Paul v. Davis, 189 the Court, however, narrowed its holding in
Constantineau, apparently foreclosing due process attacks based on
reputation alone. In Davis, the police had distributed to local
merchants a flyer describing Davis as an "active shoplifter."' 190 The
Court held that the state need not afford Davis notice or an opportu-
nity to be heard before distributing the flyer, even though this action
damaged his reputation.' 9' The majority stated:
While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the fre-
quently drastic effect of the "stigma" which may result from defa-
mation by the government in a variety of contexts, this line of cases
does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from
some more tangible interests such as employment, is either "liberty"
or "property" by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection
of the Due Process clause. 192
185. See BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.04.
186. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithan, 395 U.S. 411, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869
(1969); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
187. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
188. Id. at 437.
189. 424 U.S. 693, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
190. Id. at 695.
191. Id. at 712.
192. Id. at 701.
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The Court's decision leaves open, however, the possibility of a success-
ful due process argument based on narrower grounds. The Court rec-
ognized that an injury to one's reputation coupled with a more
tangible interest, such as employment, will trigger due process protec-
tion. For example, if a state declined to rehire a nontenured university
professor and in so doing made charges against him that might seri-
ously damage his reputation, such actions would invoke due process
protection.193
There remains the question of whether this analysis applies to
grand jury reports. Due process protection varies according to many
factors including the nature of the proceeding. The Court has not re-
quired grand juries to observe all of the procedural requirements im-
posed on other investigative bodies. In so doing, the Court has
emphasized that the grand jury does not adjudicate guilt or innocence;
it "merely investigates and reports. It does not try."' 194 This reason-
ing, however, arguably does not apply when the grand jury issues a
report, as opposed to an indictment which leads to a trial. Normally,
a grand jury report does not initiate further proceedings. Thus, in a
sense, a reporting grand jury does make a final determination of "guilt
or innocence" of noncriminal misconduct. 195 Therefore, a grand jury
report that results in injury to reputation and some tangible interest
such as employment may be subject to due process challenges unless
the criticized individual is given notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
B. Potential Reform Measures
There exist several measures that may help to curb possible
abuses of the grand jury's reportorial power and to preserve its effec-
tive use. The Alaska Constitution, however, states that the grand
jury's power "to investigate and make recommendations concerning
the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended." 196 Thus, any
reform measures adopted must not "suspend" the reporting power.
The United States Constitution and several state constitutions man-
date that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be "suspended" and
hence provide a helpful analogue to the language in article I, section
8.197 In analyzing the constitutionality of potential reform measures
for the grand jury, it may be useful to consider judicial interpretations
of the suspension clauses of the habeas corpus provisions of the federal
and state constitutions.
193. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
194. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449, reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960).
195. See BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 60, § 3.04.
196. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
197. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Generally, courts have held that legislatures may regulate proce-
dure with respect to habeas corpus and, to some extent, the purposes
for which it may be used. 198 The suspension which is prohibited re-
lates to a denial of the substantive right to have judicial inquiry into
the cause of the allegedly illegal detention.1 99
1. Independence of the Grand Jury From the Prosecutor. One
concern expressed by those courts which have disallowed reports in-
volves prosecutorial overzealousness. 200 If the prosecutor dominates
the investigation, his own ambitions can lead to a one-sided investiga-
tion and presentation of evidence. The prosecutor may initiate investi-
gations into areas where there is no apparent corruption merely to
harass certain officials or to guide the grand jury to a result he desires.
In fact, Alaska state senators who expressed dissatisfaction with the
report on the governor did not question the grand jury's power but
instead criticized the manner in which the prosecutors influenced the
proceedings.201
To curb this abuse, the grand jury should become less dependent
upon the prosecutor. Currently, because of his access to information
and investigative tools, the prosecutor directs the grand jury's opera-
tions.202 Alaska could reduce this dependence by allowing the grand
jury to conduct investigations on its own in certain situations. At least
in those areas in which the prosecutor might have a special interest,
Alaska could permit the grand jury to retain its own investigators and
counsel. This procedure would help to insure a disinterested presenta-
tion of the evidence and a thorough investigation, which would in turn
protect against the publication of false or misleading reports. These
actions would not impinge the suspension clause. These are merely
procedural steps designed to make the grand jury's power more effec-
tive. Furthermore, these steps would precede any investigation and
thus could not constitute a substantive denial of the power to issue
recommendations.
2. Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard. The grand jury conducts
its proceedings in secret and need not provide any person being inves-
tigated notice of the grand jury's inquiry or an opportunity to present
198. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeus Corpus § 5 (1968).
199. Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. 1976).
200. E.g., Simington v. Shimp, 60 Ohio App. 2d 402, 408, 398 N.E.2d 812, 817
(1978).
201. See Memorandum of Chief Prosecutor, supra note 4, at 4-5; N.Y. Times, Aug.
6, 1985, at All, col. 1.
202. Dession & Cohen, supra note 85, at 697.
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his version of the situation. 20 3 The most significant objection to re-
ports involves the lack of fairness to those criticized in reports. Oppo-
nents of grand jury reports note that the person criticized in a report
often does not learn of the report until after its publication and does
not have an opportunity to rebut its allegations in an official forum. 20 4
Alaska could mitigate these concerns by requiring that, when the
grand jury contemplates issuing a recommendation critical of a public
official, the grand jury provide the official and a limited number of
witnesses in his behalf the opportunity to testify before the grand jury
prior to the issuance of the report. When the grand jury indicts some-
one, grand jury proceedings are not a trial; the adjudication of guilt or
innocence will follow. The publication of a recommendation, how-
ever, generally represents the last step in the judicial process, and the
grand jury does, in a sense, "try" officials who are criticized in recom-
mendations. 20 5 Allowing the official to testify before the grand jury
would increase the fairness of the proceedings by permitting the offi-
cial to present his side of the story. This measure might also help to
eliminate unnecessary reports when, for example, the grand jury real-
ized that the official's actions were not negligent or incompetent but
rather were reasonable exercises of discretion.
This measure would not contravene the suspension clause of arti-
cle I, section 8. The requirement would be procedural and would not
decrease the grand jury's power. The measure might prolong the pro-
ceeding by the amount of time necessary to hear the official's testi-
mony, but it would in no way deny the grand jury the power to issue
its recommendations. Furthermore, as discussed above, due process
might require that Alaska adopt such a measure in order to provide
the official an opportunity to be heard.20 6
3. Opportunity to Append an Answer to the Report. Providing the
official an opportunity to append an answer to the report constitutes
another measure that would permit the official to explain the allega-
tions of the recommendations. This measure presents no constitu-
tional problems as long as the filing of the answer does not
unreasonably delay the publication of the report. However, if the an-
swer is filed after the publication of the recommendation, the answer
may have little value because the grand jury report will already have
had its damaging effect. 20 7 For the measure to be effective, the answer
203. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(1), (o).
204. See People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (1933).
205. See, e.g., Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 154, 173 N.E.2d 21, 26, 212
N.Y.S.2d 33, 40 (1961).
206. See Thompson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 246 Ga. 777, 780, 273
S.E.2d 19, 21 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring).
207. Cf Comment, supra note 9, at 717.
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would have to be attached to the report before its publication. To
prepare such an answer, however, takes time. New York allows the
public official twenty days to prepare an answer.20 8 There is a strong
argument that a delay of this length "suspends" the grand jury's
power by reducing the effectiveness of the recommendation. The
framers intended that this power be used to protect Alaska's citi-
zens. 20 9 Grand jury reports concern conditions inimical to the public
welfare. Where such conditions exist, a lengthy delay to allow a criti-
cized official to answer the allegations may further harm the public
interest by delaying corrective action.
4. Pre-publication Factual Review by the Trial Court. Some states
use pre-publication factual review of a report by the court impanelling
the grand jury to ensure that false reports are not publicized. New
York requires that the trial court suppress a report critical of an indi-
vidual unless the court finds that the report is supported by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.210 New Jersey requires "conclusive" proof of
allegations in a report criticizing a public official.211 Adopting one of
these standards in Alaska would raise significant constitutional ques-
tions. Of course, the framers of the Alaska Constitution did not in-
tend that there be false or misleading recommendations. However,
granting the grand jury the power to investigate and make recommen-
dations implies that the grandjury should be the body that evaluates
the evidence disclosed by the investigation. Allowing a trial judge to
reweigh that evidence and perhaps to suppress the recommendation
would usurp the grand jury's power. It would appear that such a level
of review would contravene the suspension clause.
A somewhat lesser standard of review, however, should pass con-
stitutional muster. Florida allows its courts to suppress reports that
lack a factual basis in the record of the grand jury proceeding. 212 This
standard does not require reweighing the evidence but merely involves
determining whether the facts in the record support the grand jury's
conclusions and recommendations.2 13 The wording of article I, sec-
tion 8 in fact suggests such a standard. The section links the grand
jury's investigating and reporting powers. It does not empower the
grand jury to make recommendations in the abstract or based upon
speculation. The grand jury must base its recommendation upon the
208. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(3) (McKinney 1982).
209. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1405.
210. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.85(2)(a) (McKinney 1982).
211. N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3: 6-9(c) (1986).
212. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 521 (Fla. 1977).
213. See Appeal of Untreiner, 391 So. 2d 272, 274-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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results of its investigation. If the investigation does not disclose evi-
dence sufficient to support the conclusions and recommendations, the
court should not publish the report.
VII. CONCLUSION
The framers of the Alaska Constitution intended that the grand
jury have the power to investigate and make recommendations on
matters that concern the public welfare. They contemplated that such
recommendations would contain criticism of public officials in limited
circumstances. This note has suggested that grand jury reports should
contain criticism of public officials only if the public conditions at is-
sue are inescapably connected with the official's noncriminal failure to
discharge his duty.
To help prevent false reports, to ensure fairness to the individual,
and to withstand possible due process challenges, this note recom-
mends that the Alaska legislature adopt the following provisions con-
cerning grand jury procedures in issuing recommendations:
(1) No recommendations may criticize an official for conduct com-
ing within the parameters of a criminal statute.
(2) In investigations in which the prosecutor may have an interest,
the trial court shall permit the grand jury to hire its own investiga-
tors and counsel.
(3) When the grand jury contemplates issuing a recommendation
that may criticize an identifiable official, it shall provide that official
and a limited number of witnesses in his behalf the opportunity to
testify before the grand jury.
(4) The trial court shall not accept for public filing any recommen-
dation that lacks a factual foundation.
These measures will not only increase the efficacy of the reporting
power but will also accord fairness to the subject of a report, thus
meeting the objections that many jurisdictions have toward reports
critical of specific individuals. This will permit the grand jury to serve
better its purpose of "protect[ing] the rights of [Alaska] citizens."
Frank W. Cureton
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APPENDIX: MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION CONCERNING
ARTICLE I, SECTION 8.
PRESIDENT EGAN: If there is no further discussion - Mr.
Londborg.
LONDBORG: I believe if Mr. Barr would offer his amendment as an
amendment to this amendment, it would be in order, and I think that
whether that is included or not that will have a bearing on whether I
vote for the amendment to Committee Proposal No. 7 or whether I
vote to retain Committee Proposal No. 7.
PRESIDENT EGAN: Was it your desire to offer your proposed
amendment as an amendment to the amendment, Mr. Barr?
BARR: It wasn't because I hesitate to interfere with anybody's
amendment. I would like to offer it if this amendment we're reconsid-
ering now, is adopted. However, I can see that there might be opposi-
tion to the amendment under consideration unless mine is also
included. I feel that way.
PRESIDENT EGAN: You are free to offer your amendment as an
amendment to this amendment if you so desire.
BARR: I might ask if any of the authors of this amendment would
object to adding mine.
PRESIDENT EGAN: If they would object to your asking that it be
added? Would you please read Mr. Barr's proposed amendment?
CHIEF CLERK: "At the end of Section 7, as amended, add the fol-
lowing paragraph: 'The power of grand juries to investigate and make
recommendations concerning conditions detrimental to the public wel-
fare or safety shall never be suspended.' "
BARR: That is an additional paragraph. If none of the authors of
this amendment object, I would like to offer this as an amendment to
the amendment. I so move.
PRESIDENT EGAN: Mr. Barr so moves.
BARR: I ask unanimous consent.
PRESIDENT EGAN: Mr. Barr asks unanimous consent. Is there
objection?
BUCKALEW: I object.
JOHNSON: I second the motion.
R. RIVERS: Point of clarification. Does he intend to have it added
onto what we already have?
PRESIDENT EGAN: That is right, added onto what we already
have as the proposed amendment before us. Mr. Buckalew.
BUCKALEW: From my first impression and my prime objection to
this particular amendment is that I think and feel certain it will open
the door, for example, the grand jury might have under investigation
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the conduct of some particular public office, for example, the gover-
nor, or any public official, the local tax collector. They don't have
enough evidence to return an indictment but this would give them the
power to blast him good and hard, and I think it would lead to all
kinds of trouble, and I think it is an unheard of provision. The recom-
mendation of the Committee provided that the grand jury could inves-
tigate, they could return indictments, but it certainly did not give them
the privilege to more or less defame somebody if they did not have
quite enough action for a bill. Under this they could discredit him
completely, and he would have no way of answering. He might be
able to come back and get the report of the grand jury stricken from
the records of the court, but the damage would then be done. I think
it is extremely dangerous because a citizen would not have any protec-
tion. Once it was published the only thing he could do would be to
then come in and ask the court to strike portions of it. For that reason
I would object to it.
R. RIVERS: The present province of our grand jury is to investigate
public offices and institutions, not just to investigate anything involv-
ing the public welfare. I wonder if Mr. Barr is intending to try to
preserve what we already have now, as the province of the grand jury.
Would you consent to having it worded as "investigate public offices
and institutions and make recommendations"?
BARR: No. I think that their power should be a little broader than
that. I don't know what the powers are right now exactly, but I do
know that they make recommendations concerning other things than
public offices and officers, and under this provision it would only in-
vestigate and make recommendations concerning things that endan-
gered public welfare's safety, and I believe that is what the grand jury
is for is to protect the rights of its citizens. They do not necessarily
have to defame any person or mention him by name. If the tax collec-
tor was using methods not acceptable to the public, they might make a
recommendation for a change in the system of tax collection, etc., and
I think it would be their duty to do so.
PRESIDENT EGAN: Is there further discussion of the proposed
amendment to the amendment? Mr. Hellenthal.
HELLENTHAL: Mr. President, my suggestion was that the word
"detrimental" be stricken and the word "involving" be inserted be-
cause I agree with Mr. Barr that the investigatory power of a grand
jury is extremely broad, not as narrow as Mr. Rivers contends. I think
a grand jury can investigate anything, and it is true that there is little
protection against what they call in the vernacular, a runaway grand
jury, but in the history of the United States there have been few run-
away grand juries, extremely few, and I think that the broad statement
of power that Mr. Barr asked for is proper and healthy.
PRESIDENT EGAN: Mr. Sundborg.
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SUNDBORG: Mr. President, I move and ask unanimous consent
that the amendment to the amendment offered by Mr. Barr be
amended by striking the words "detrimental to" in the second line and
substituting therefore the word "involving."
RILEY: Mr. President, point of order. I believe I think Mr. Barr's
submission on this was contingent upon no objection. There was ob-
jection raised, so it is not before us yet.
PRESIDENT EGAN: It is before us, it was moved and seconded, but
the Chair was wondering if Mr. Barr was acceptable to that proposed
amendment as suggested by Mr. Hellenthal. Are you, Mr. Barr?
BARR: Yes, Mr. President.
PRESIDENT EGAN: I was wondering if you might ask to withdraw
it and have it inserted with the proposed words in it, if that is your
wish. Then we will get around to this amendment for the third or
fourth time.
BARR: I ask permission to withdraw my amendment and submit an-
other amendment in lieu thereof.
PRESIDENT EGAN: If there is no objection, the proposed amend-
ment is ordered withdrawn.
BARR: I would like to submit the same amendment but using the
word "involving" instead of "detrimental to" and I ask unanimous
consent for its adoption.
BUCKALEW: I object.
BARR: I so move.
JOHNSON: I second the motion.
PRESIDENT EGAN: Mr. Barr moves and Mr. Johnson seconds the
motion. If there is no further discussion, the question is, "Shall the
proposed amendment as offered by Mr. Barr to the amendment as
amended be adopted by the Convention?" All those in favor of the
adoption of the proposed amendment to the amendment as amended
will signify by saying "aye," all opposed by saying "no." The "ayes"
have it and the proposed amendment is ordered adopted
Yeas: 44 - Armstrong, Awes, Barr, Boswell, Coghill, Cross, Davis,
Emberg, V. Fischer, Gray, Harris, Hellenthal, Hermann,
Hinckel, Hurley, Johnson, Kilcher, King, Knight, Lee,
Londborg, McCutcheon, McLaughlin, McNealy,
McNees, Marston, Metcalf, Nerland, Nolan, Nordale,
Peratrovich, Poulsen, Reader, R. Rivers, Robertson,
Rosswog, Stewart, Sundborg, Sweeney, Taylor,
VanderLeest, Walsh, White, Wien.
Nays: 8 - Buckalew, Doogan, H. Fischer, Laws, Riley, V. Rivers,
Smith, Mr. President.
Absent: 3 - Collins, Cooper, Hilscher.

